Pridnestrovie Info

Pridnestrovian Ambiguities

Many things are declared with regard to Pridnestrovie, but it does not necessarily mean that they have been properly thought through. Within the recent years, even meek Moldovans have been testing their courage talking about the geopolitical interests of the Russian Federation. Indeed, if one is not completely blinded by the “Eastern Light”, it is enough to read the Memorandums – the one signed on May 8, 1997, and the one that was not signed but presented to the public in November 2003 – in order to understand that the Russian Federation is not interested in the integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova. And the illegal presence of Russian troops on the Moldovan territory is nothing else but “occupation”. At the same time, it is not very clear why Pridnestrovie is so dear to the Russian Federation – a piece of land cramped between the Ukraine and the rest of Moldova, with an area less than 0.02% of the territory of Russia, with a population comparable to the population of a sector of Moscow, and with no military importance whatsoever. Well, certain business is done in Pridnestrovie. Russia has obtained, also by means of illegal actions, certain property in Pridnestrovie. But again, if we compare the volume of Pridnestrovien business with the total volume of Russian affairs, we will see that its share is ridiculously small. And going back to geopolitical theories, it is obvious that namely the attitude of Ukraine is the decisive factor in this part of the continent, and not the “unshakable will of Pridnestrovien people”.

Returning to the signed-unsigned documents related to the Pridnestrovien issue, we can conclude that Russia wants to eliminate the Republic of Moldova as a unitary and indivisible state. And when they firmly state that Pridnestrovie must obtain “an incontestably guaranteed special legal status” and insist that the solution should be achieved within negotiations between “equal parties”, one should be very hurt by the fate not to understand that these solutions refer to confederative relations between these “equal parties” within the “common” state.

As for the statement that many things are not properly thought through, it is not clear how Russia could achieve its goal. It is obvious that the undeclared economic war, reckless increase of gas price, possible introduction of visa regime for Moldovans and aggressive informational war could significantly influence the correlation of forces (or impotencies) in the following Parliament of the Republic of Moldova. You need not be a prophet to understand that, just like within the recent election campaign in the USA, when Bush administration has been accused of failure in Iraq, in the Republic of Moldova, the Communists Party headed by Vladimir Voronin will be accused by a number of hereditary patriots for breaking relations with Russia, when the fight for mandates in the next Parliament starts. Consequently, there is a great probability that we will have a fragmented and inoperative Parliament after the following elections. But still, the prospect of legalizing the solution desired by the Kremlin, even in such Moldovan Parliament or by means of a referendum, is doubtful. Not mentioning the fact that the EU or the USA could interfere again, as it already happened in November 2003. Of course, we cannot definitively exclude the possibility of Russia recognizing Pridnestrovie, the same way Turkey has done with regard to Turks in Cyprus. Nevertheless, it is not likely that Putin, who has to settle the problem of transmitting the chair of the Russian President to somebody in 2008 with minimum risks and, at the same time, who does not want to lose control of the real power, is ready to create himself additional trouble for the sake of “Pridnestrovien people”. Consequently, I am not sure that Russia knows how and by means of what specific mechanisms it could achieve the desired goal.

On August 8, 2006, after a number of continuous efforts of the Moldovan party, Vladimir Voronin paid a working visit to Moscow. On the eve of the event, an article appeared in the Russian newspaper “Kommersant” attempting to outline a rational approach to the Pridnestrovien issue, according to which the Republic of Moldova would re-establish its territorial integrity, while Russia would obtain its benefits (property legalization, image of an efficient and democratic peace-maker, etc.). Recently, following these efforts, Moscow was visited by Vasilie Sova, Minister of Reintegration, and Mark Tkaciuk, President’s Counsellor. After the visit, nothing important was announced. On November 17, 2006, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs made public an official statement, according to which there were no changes in the position of Russia. And the Ministry of Reintegration issued a press-release saying that: on November 20, the Minister of Reintegration had a meeting with the Ambassadors of the EU countries and the USA, within which: “Vasilie Sova mentioned that discussions in Moscow had been focused on subjects agreed within the process of negotiations in 5+2 format. The Minister of Reintegration emphasized the fact that the need for such consultations had been determined by the recent lack of opinion exchange with the Russian party.” Consequently, this time the Moldovan government would like to eliminate any suspicions on the part of the EU and the USA regarding the possibility of the second Kozak Memorandum, when the West had to interfere immediately in order not to allow signing the dodgy document.

Meanwhile, the Russian Federation has created another mechanism of consolidating Pridnestrovien positions to the detriment of the Republic of Moldova – on November 21, in Tiraspol, a Cooperation Agreement was signed between Natalia Narochnitskaya, chairman of the Russian Federation State Duma Committee for practices of ensuring human rights and fundamental freedoms in foreign states, and a certain Sipchenko, the Tiraspol counterpart of the lady with the long title from the State Duma. Moreover, Natalia Narochnitskaya, as the second person in the delegation of the Russian Federation to PACE, solemnly promised in Tiraspol to bring the “truth” about Pridnestrovie to the High-Level European Forum, should someone try to slander the authentic Pridnestrovien democracy. And at the same time, on November 21, 2006, in Brussels, the Agreement on Information Exchange between Ukraine and Moldova wit the view to implementing an automatic information exchange system on the movement of goods and people through the common border was signed in the presence of Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy. This means that the EU is not going to let the situation at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border out of control, in defiance of the intentions of the Kremlin and Tiraspol to impose the approval of a “Transit Protocol” that would re-establish the criminal disorder along the 452 km of the border not controlled by Chisinau.

Summing up the above-said, we can conclude that certain movement is taking place at different levels and in different directions regarding the Pridnestrovien issue. The world is changing and, at least theoretically, we can admit that Russia can be convinced to change its position, especially if there is a scenario for its honourable withdrawal from Pridnestrovie. Consequently, it is natural that Moldovan officials are trying to obtain at least something, including by means of a dialogue with Russia. It is important that we, citizens of the Republic of Moldova, are informed about what is being plotted as well. Nevertheless, there are no signs of Russia being willing to accept such a scenario. Especially when neither Chisinau shows signs of being able to take advantage of the situation, when the majority of people on the left side of the Nistru River cannot even look at the criminal Igor Smirnov together with his sons anymore. But this is another story…

| posted: 28 November 2006